GitHub Actions and consequences

Trivy is an open-source security scanner. But if you used Trivy in late March, you had a bad time.

On March 19th, hackers pushed a version of Trivy that tried to smuggle secrets from anywhere it ran. Trivy cited a “misconfiguration” in their continuous integration (CI) system, GitHub Actions.

But the exploit was less a misconfiguration and more a GitHub Actions trap.

Here’s a simplified version of how Trivy got pwnd²:

# INSECURE. DO NOT USE.
on:
  pull_request_target

jobs:
  check:
    steps:
      - uses: action/checkout@deadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeefdeadbeef
        with:
          ref: refs/pull/${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}/merge
      - uses: ./.github/actions/setup-go
      - uses: some/go-static-analysis@c0ffeec0ffeec0ffeec0ffeec0ffeec0ffeec0ff

At first glance, this code looks fine:

• No secrets referenced.
• Third-party actions pinned to an immutable hash.
• Check out a pull request. Perform some static analysis.

But this code is a verbatim antipattern from a 2021 GitHub blog post titled “preventing pwn requests”:

if the pull_request_target workflow only […] runs untrusted code but doesn’t reference any secrets, is it still vulnerable?

Yes it is

– GitHub Security Lab

The problem is pull_request_target:

• pull_request_target – plunks a nice, juicy GITHUB_TOKEN into the environment.
• actions/checkout – takes an optional parameter persist-credentials, which removes secrets if set to false. But the default for the parameter is true.

Setting the persist-credentials parameter to false has been an open issue in GitHub Actions since 2021.

Your $HOME is a crime scene

Once hackers had Trivy’s keys, they published a new version of Trivy to steal more keys.

LiteLLM used Trivy in their CI. The same CI they used to publish code to PyPI, the Python software registry. When LiteLLM’s CI ran the compromised Trivy, hackers nabbed their publishing key.

And on March 24th, when Callum McMahon fired up his IDE, his MacBook froze. And that’s how he discovered the LiteLLM hijack.

McMahon’s MacBook was flailing at bad code that hackers snuck into LiteLLM. And the bad code trying to steal credentials:

• ~/.netrc
• ~/.aws/credentials
• ~/.config/gcloud
• ~/.config/gh
• ~/.azure
• ~/.docker/config.json
• ~/.npmrc
• ~/.git-credentials
• ~/.kube/

Files that are typically strewn around $HOME directories, full of tokens and keys, often unencrypted.

AI and the supply chain doom spiral

We’ve dealt with problems like unencrypted credentials, unpinned dependencies, and CI footguns forever.

But AI has accelerated everything, including repeating security mistakes.

On the day of the Trivy compromise, I asked Claude, “how do I scan docker registry images for security vulnerabilities?”

The reply, in part:

CI/CD Integration Example (GitHub Actions with Trivy)

    - name: Scan image for vulnerabilities
      uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@master

Broken in two ways:

1. Unpinned references – master is a reference that changes all the time. If hackers zombify the repo, I’d be the first victim.
2. Active vulnerability – No mention whatsoever of the CVE posted that day. I never asked, so Claude never checked.

Meanwhile, Vercel’s CEO has attributed his company’s recent data breach to a hacker that was “accelerated by AI.” And Anthropic’s latest hype tour includes briefing the US Federal Reserve Chair about vulnerabilities unearthed by their frontier model.

Bad guys with LLMs get superpowers. Good guys with LLMs fall prey to mid-2010’s CI problems.

And the same tool that can root out 27-year-old security problems in OpenBSD, will still tell you to pin your GitHub actions to @master.